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Abstract
On 20 – 21st October 2017 the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies hosted the second Annual Conference of the Florence 
Competition Programme (FCP) at the European University Institute 
(EUI) campus in Florence. The event was organised in cooperation 
with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). The conference discussed the future of competition policy 
in light of the growing anti-globalisation and populist political 
movements around the world. The event was opened with a keynote 
speech that was delivered by Kris Dekeyser, Director for Policy and 
Strategy of DG Competition of the European Commission. The 
conference was divided into four panels which dealt respectively 
with i) Private enforcement of competition law after Brexit; ii) State 
aid law enforcement after Brexit; iii) US antitrust enforcement under 
the Trump administration; and iv) Anti-globalisation and the future 
of antitrust enforcement around the world. The event gathered 
different stakeholders, including competition enforcers as well as 
representatives from academia, industry, law and economic consulting 
firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively debate. This Policy Brief 
summarises the main points raised during the discussion and seeks to 
stimulate further debate.
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I. Background Discussion: Competition 
Policy and Globalisation
Since WWII, worldwide trade has substantially increased, 
and companies have started to operate in global markets. 
Globalisation has increased the inter-dependency of 
countries and has introduced competition into industries 
where it would have been unforeseeable a few decades 
ago. However, globalisation has also caused an increase 
in the “size” of the corporations, making it more difficult 
for national governments to ensure that transnational 
economic operators comply with national rules, including 
competition rules.  
A first issue at the crossroads between competition 
policy and economic globalisation is the extra-territorial 
enforcement of competition rules. As recognised by the 
Court of the Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 
Gencor1, and, more recently, in Intel,2 EU competition 
law is applicable vis à vis anti-competitive conduct that 
takes place outside the EU, and which has a foreseeable 
and substantial effect on the EU market (the ‘qualified 
effects’ doctrine). The extra-territorial enforcement of 
competition rules is a principle that is well established in 
EU competition law, as well as in most of the antitrust 
jurisdictions around the world. Extra-territoriality, 
however, raises a number of issues for competition 
enforcers. Among the most relevant are practical 
challenges for authorities concerning the collection 
of evidence for anti-competitive conduct taking place 
outside of the authority’s jurisdiction. The same is true 
with reference to the effective implementation of fines 
or remedies that are imposed on companies based in 
another jurisdiction. Furthermore, extra-territorial 
enforcement of competition law may raise conflicts with 
foreign governments, where the remedy impinges on the 
sovereignty of another jurisdiction. 
During the past twenty years, the spread of competition 
law jurisdictions around the world has increased 
the number of cases of extra-territorial enforcement 
of competition rules, calling for enhanced forms 
of cooperation amongst competition authorities. 
Authorities discuss areas of coordination within the 
International Competition Network (ICN), the OECD 
and, increasingly, they cooperate at the bilateral level. 
1.  Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission. ECLI:EU:T:1999:65. 
2.  Case C-413/14 P, Intel v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632.
For instance, DG Competition has recently concluded a 
second-generation cooperation agreement with the Swiss 
competition authority;3 furthermore, it is negotiating 
similar agreements with Canadian and Japanese 
competition authorities to allow for the exchange of 
evidence. 
Even with the lack of a formal bilateral agreement, 
competition authorities often cooperate when 
investigating the same cross-border competition law case. 
In particular, in a number of international cartel cases, 
DG Competition at the EU Commission has coordinated 
the timing of dawn raids with many other competition 
authorities outside Europe. International cooperation 
among different authorities has increased particularly in 
the field of merger control. Between 2010 and 2015, in more 
than half the complex merger cases DG Competition dealt 
with, it has exchanged information with extra-European 
competition authorities. At the multilateral level, the ICN 
has developed a confidentiality waiver model, whereby 
the merging parties may authorise reviewing authorities 
to exchange confidential information in order to avoid 
diverging assessments of the same transaction.4 
In spite of the harmonisation process and the higher 
degree of cooperation among competition authorities, a 
number of major challenges still affect the enforcement 
of competition policy in cross-border cases:
1) Procedural differences in merger control: in the field 
of merger control, substantial procedural discrepancies 
still affect the reviews carried out by different authorities 
on the same concentration. In this regard, during the 
workshop it was noted that the ICN merger-working 
group is currently updating its recommendations in order 
to achieve a greater degree of procedural convergence.
2) Multi-jurisdictional cartel leniency applications: 
workshop participants stressed that disincentives to apply 
for leniency could arise from the proliferation of regimes 
as potential applicants face an increased  administrative 
burden and a greater exposure to fines. Overall, 
incentives to apply still outweigh the disincentives as the 
risks of heavy sanctions can only be eliminated by being 
3. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ecn-brief/en/
content/swiss-cooperation-agreement-competition-enfor-
cement-enters-force (4.12.2017).
4. http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wor-
king-groups/current/merger.aspx (4.12.2017).
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the first to apply for leniency. However, to maintain the 
attractiveness of leniency, authorities need to face certain 
challenges such as ensuring protection from prosecution 
of employees of applicants and developing an effective ex 
officio strategy to increase the chances of detection, which 
serves to bring applicants forward. 
3) Double sanctions in multi-jurisdictional cases: 
corporations often claim that they are exposed to 
“double” sanctions by different NCAsauthorities. The 
issue is particularly relevant in relation to fines imposed 
on cross-border cartels, but it also affects structural and 
behavioural remedies in merger control and cases of 
unilateral conduct. During the workshop, it was noted 
that the ne bis in idem principle is not applicable to cross-
border parallel competition law cases investigations per 
se. NCAs Authorities cannot take into consideration the 
fines that have already been imposed by other authorities 
for the same violation if the geographic market affected 
is different; furthermore, the nature of this type of 
infringement does not make it very easy for a national 
authority to calculate the amount of the fine so as to 
realistically sanction conduct that has occurred only 
within a single jurisdiction. However, principles of comity 
and proportionality argue for imposing fines that reflect 
the territorial jurisdiction of the particular agency and 
addresses the harm to consumers within that territory.  
II. Consequences of Brexit for the Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law
The rise of anti-globalisation and populist political 
movements has posed particular challenges to the 
enforcement of competition policy. From a legal point 
of view, it was remarked during the workshop that 
Brexit would impact on a number of aspects relating to 
competition law enforcement in the UK and in the EU. 
In particular, Brexit will have the following effects on the 
public enforcement of EU competition law:
1) Application of Art. 101-102 TFEU: the UK Competition 
and Market Authority (CMA) will no longer have 
jurisdiction to enforce Art. 101-102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); the CMA 
will be able to rely only on the corresponding national 
provisions sanctioning anti-competitive agreements and 
the abuse of dominance. The CMA will therefore take into 
consideration the impact of anti-competitive conduct 
within the UK, without assessing the effect in other EU 
Member States. Similarly, the EU Commission will only 
sanction anti-competitive conduct affecting the EEA.
2) CJEU preliminary rulings: after Brexit, UK courts 
will not be able to ask for preliminary rulings from the 
CJEU. In addition, as recently pointed out by Art. 6 of 
the UK Withdrawal Bill,5 British courts will no longer be 
bound by the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg courts. 
According to some participants, the lack of preliminary 
rulings and of the binding effect of CJEU case law may, 
in the long term, affect the coherence of the enforcement 
of UK and EU competition rules. By contrast, other 
panellists pointed out that although the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU will not be binding for British courts, the 
latter will probably rely on such case law as guidance, 
thus minimising the risk of potentially inconsistent 
interpretation of UK and EU competition rules.
3) The status of CMA within the European Competition 
Network (ECN): after Brexit, the CMA will no longer be 
part of the ECN. In order to preserve the current system 
of cooperation, the EU Commission and the competition 
authorities of each EU Member State will have to conclude 
separate cooperation agreements with the CMA.
Brexit will also affect the private enforcement of EU 
competition law:
1) EU Commission decisions will not be binding for UK 
courts: after Brexit, Art. 16 Reg. 1/2003 will no longer 
be applicable in the UK. Consequently, EU Commission 
decisions sanctioning a cartel will not be binding for 
the UK courts in follow-on damage actions. During 
the debate, a number of panellists pointed out that this 
change will decrease the attractiveness of British tribunals 
in follow-on damage cases. On the other hand, other 
participants stressed that Brexit will not have an impact 
on the number of stand-alone cases. The latter already 
represent the majority of claims that are started at the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in cases of an abuse 
of dominance.
2) Brussels Regulation: this piece of legislation governs the 
mutual recognition and enforceability of civil judgements 
among EU Member States.6 The Brussels Regulation is 
5. https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europea-
nunionwithdrawal.html (5.12.2017).
6. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CE-
LEX:32001R0044 (5.12.2017).
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crucial to the current system for the private enforcement 
of competition law: in a cross-border competition law 
case, a claimant can select as a forum the national court 
of any EU Member State and ask for the recognition 
of the ruling in another of the EU Member States. 
After Brexit, the UK will still be bound by the Lugano 
Convention,7 which regulates the court jurisdiction and 
mutual recognition of rulings in civil cases among the 
countries that are part of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). According to some participants, the shift from the 
Brussels Regulation to the Lugano Convention will create 
doubts as to the recognition of rulings of British courts in 
continental Europe. By contrast, a number of participants 
pointed out that the content of the Lugano Convention 
is very similar to that of the Brussels Regulation. In the 
view of those participants, the shift from the Brussels 
Regulation to the Lugano Convention will therefore not 
affect legal certainty for claimants who choose the UK as 
a forum in cross-border competition law damage claims.
Besides Brexit, the Damages Directive will also influence 
the private enforcement of competition law in Europe 
in the coming years.8 The Directive, in fact, harmonises 
a number of procedural rules that are relevant in 
competition law damage cases, and it increases the role of 
economic analysis in cases of the private enforcement of 
competition law. Firstly, by broadening the disclosure of 
evidence in court proceedings, the Directive encourages 
economic analysis in damage claims: external economic 
experts hired by the parties, in fact, will be able to rely 
on a larger amount of data in their analysis. Secondly, 
together with the Damages Directive, in June, 2013, the 
EU Commission published a Practical Guide that was 
addressed to national courts.9 This soft law document 
provides an overview of the methods followed by 
economists to quantify the antitrust damage, which is 
expected to increase the understanding of national courts 
in this respect. 
The Damages Directive establishes a level playing field 
among EU Member States, in terms of procedural rules 
that are applicable to damage claims. According to some 
7. https://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-
textes/lug-idx.htm (5.12.2017).
8. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uri-
serv:OJ.L_.2014.349.01.0001.01.ENG (5.12.2017).
9. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsda-
mages/quantification_en.html (5.12.2017).
participants, claimants that previously relied on the more 
favourable UK procedural rules (e.g., broader disclosure 
rules) will thus have fewer incentives to bring claims in 
UK courts. On the other hand, other panellists pointed 
out that, unlike other courts in continental Europe, the 
CAT and the UK High Court have specialised judges in 
competition law. Accordingly, this aspect may preserve 
the UK’s leading role in this field.
Overall, the impact of Brexit on trends in private 
enforcement of competition law is still unclear and 
was subject to a lively debate during the FCP Annual 
Conference. The implementation of the Damages 
Directive will also play an important role to this regard.
III. Brexit and State Aid Law
The EU is the main trading partner for the UK, covering 
45% of UK exports and 50% of UK imports. The impact 
of Brexit on UK GDP has been analysed in a number 
of studies. According to a recent report, published by 
Rabobank in October, 2017, UK GDP will decrease by 
between 10% and 18% GDP until 2030, in comparison 
to the pre-Brexit expectations.10 Brexit will also have a 
negative impact on EU GDP, which is estimated to be at 
least 1% of EU GDP. Ireland, Netherlands and Belgium 
are the countries that will be most negatively affected by 
Brexit, due to their close economic links with the UK.
Participants agreed on the fact that the UK has a 
history of a low subsidisation of its economy. Most of 
the granted subsidies are horizontal aid schemes put in 
place to promote renewable energy sources, broadband 
development, R&D and risk capital; the subsidies granted 
in the UK rarely have a distortive effect on competition 
in the market. It is therefore debatable whether a new 
system of subsidy control will have to be put in place after 
Brexit. Nevertheless, the expected negative effects, caused 
by Brexit, on the British economy in the near future may 
lead the British government to increase the degree of 
subsidisation of the economy, especially to attract FDIs. 
It therefore seems unlikely that Brexit negotiations will 
be concluded unless the UK establishes a form of subsidy 
control.
10. https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2017/octo-
ber/the-permanent-damage-of-brexit/ (5.12.2017).
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An issue debated during the FCP Annual Conference 
concerned the ways in which a new State aid law regime 
might be established in the UK after Brexit, and how it 
might work in practice. A number of possible scenarios 
were discussed during the Annual Conference:
1) Transitional model: during a transitional phase, the 
UK could continue to be subject to EU State aid control 
from the EU Commission. Due to the possible extension 
of the Brexit negotiations, this may be a likely scenario in 
the coming years. In addition, even after Brexit, the UK 
may be subject to EU State aid rules for a few years before 
establishing an alternative internal system of control. The 
major issue in this scenario would be the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU in the enforcement of State aid law; jurisdiction 
that would not be acceptable to the British government.
2) The CMA, as the State aid monitoring authority: With 
reference to the internal system of State aid control, the 
EU usually requires the establishment of an internal 
system of State aid control in bilateral trade agreements 
concluded with third countries. Participants stressed 
that in the framework of Brexit negotiations, the EU 
Commission would probably put forward a similar 
request. The future EU-UK bilateral agreement might 
require the United Kingdom to introduce an internal 
system of State aid control that would be enforced by an 
independent authority, like the CMA. The major issue in 
this scenario would concern the effective degree of the 
independence of the State aid monitoring authority from 
the British government. Unlike competition law, State aid 
law is a politically sensitive subject. 
3) The EFTA Court: In the EEA, the enforcement of State 
aid rules is conferred on supranational authorities, such as 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court.11 
In her recent Florence speech on Brexit, Prime Minister 
May rejected the EEA model for the UK. 12 However, 
some aspects of the EEA model may be used to find a 
middle-ground institutional solution that is suitable for 
both the EU and UK. In particular, while the CMA may 
be in charge of State aid control at the domestic level, 
its decisions could be appealed before the EFTA Court, 
rather than before a British tribunal. A British judge 
could join the members of the EFTA Court in every 
11.  http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/ (24.10.2017).
12. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-
may-f lorence-speech-in-full-read-brexit-plan-eu-talks-
single-market-divorce-bill-a7961596.html (24.10.2017).
case involving the UK. The CJEU’s President Lenaerts 
has recently proposed to extend the jurisdiction of the 
EFTA Court to solve any EU-UK disputes after Brexit. 
The EFTA Court would be an alternative to the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction, which will not be acceptable to the British 
government after Brexit.
4) WTO subsidy rules: participants noted that, in the case 
of a lack of agreement between the EU and the UK on the 
system of State aid control, the application of the current 
WTO rules on subsidies would be the fall back scenario. 
The latter rules, however, are only applicable to subsidies 
to goods, not those to services. In addition, WTO rules 
provide for a list of prohibited subsidies per se (e.g., red 
line subsidies, like export aids). However, most of the 
subsidies granted in the UK are horizontal aids that are 
not prohibited per se, and they would require a case-by-
case assessment. Finally, the annual reporting obligations 
on subsidies included in the WTO agreement are usually 
not fully compliant with the WTO Member States. The 
WTO framework does not therefore seem to be a suitable 
solution or the introduction of an effective mechanism of 
State aid control into the UK.
5) Anti-dumping duties: closely connected to the previous 
scenario is the imposition of anti-dumping duties on 
imported UK products, in case the latter had been 
subsidised. In the EU, the anti-dumping mechanism starts 
with a complaint submitted by the affected Community 
producers to the EU Commission.13 Besides showing 
the presence of dumping, the complainant has to prove 
the presence of a material injury, a causal link between 
the dumping and the injury, as well as the existence of 
a Community interest to intervene. The burden of proof 
to activate the anti-dumping mechanism, therefore, is 
particularly high, and it is thus unlikely to replace a system 
of State aid control. In addition, the EU Commission 
can only impose anti-dumping duties on imported UK 
products that is equivalent to the value of the dumping. 
However, such a redress mechanism will not necessarily 
solve the injury suffered by the Community producers.
Another issue debated during the FCP Annual 
Conference concerned the future of EU State aid law 
after Brexit. Historically, the UK has influenced State aid 
law enforcement in the EU: first, since the UK is not a 
13. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/
trade-defence/actions-against-imports-into-the-eu/an-
ti-dumping/ (24.10.2017).
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subsidy-oriented country, it has generally requested that 
the EU Commission strongly enforce State aid rules 
vis-à-vis other EU Member States. The question is thus 
whether the EU Commission will become more lenient 
in enforcing State aid rules after Brexit. Secondly, the 
UK has promoted a modern use of subsidies, one that is 
focused on risk capital, R&D, the promotion of renewable 
energy. In this respect, the question is whether this trend 
will change within the EU after Brexit. Finally, the UK has 
promoted the reliance on economic insights in EU State 
aid analysis; it is a question if Brexit may negatively affect 
economic analysis in EU State aid control.
IV. US Antitrust Enforcement Under 
Trump Administration: Continuation or 
Breakage With the Past?
During the third session of the Conference, participants 
analysed the challenges that are currently being raised 
by the Trump administration to antitrust enforcement 
in the USA. First, it was provided an overview of the 
institutional framework, describing the main features 
of the two agencies that are responsible for enforcing 
antitrust laws in the United States. It was remarked that the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) share this authority, but 
that each has specific expertise in particular industries. In 
addition, the DoJ, which is part of the executive branch 
and operates under the US Attorney General, is entrusted 
with criminal enforcement tasks. 
Participants highlighted the fact that the FTC is 
a bipartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that is 
technically independent of the Executive Branch, with 
the dual mission to protect consumers and to promote 
competition. Its core activities involve actions to protect 
competition, prevent fraudulent or misleading claims, 
and develop policies with regard to privacy, but it also 
focuses on competition advocacy and research work. 
Generally speaking, the FTC’s approach should be driven 
by the principle of regulatory humility, according to which 
it is fundamental to recognise the inherent limitations of 
regulation in order for an enforcer to act in accordance 
with them.
It was noted that, in the last few years, the FTC has 
undertaken numerous efforts to preserve economic 
liberty while, at the same time, benefitting consumers. 
For example, the Acting Chair, Maureen Olhausen, has 
launched a massive advocacy effort to reform occupational 
licensing with the objective of minimizing the impact of 
the burdensome requirements that must be satisfied in 
order to provide certain services. Although the Trump 
administration may have a negative impact on the FTC’s 
enforcement and policy-making actions, when the Chair 
was asked to express her opinion about it in Washington, 
D.C., just over a month after the presidential election, she 
stated: “I have seen other transitions before so, just looking 
to the past as an indicator, I would say the FTC is very good 
at handing the baton from one administration to the next. 
And there has been a lot of consistency in data privacy and 
security issues.” 
Secondly, the debate focused on the history of antitrust 
foundations in the US. In 'The Antitrust Paradox' (1978) 
Robert Bork, a prominent first-generation scholar of 
the Chicago School, criticised the state of US antitrust 
law in the 1970s. According to Bork, the only objective 
of the Sherman Act was to safeguard consumer welfare. 
Practices that are allegedly exclusionary, such as vertical 
agreements and price discrimination, did not therefore 
have to be prohibited, since they were not harmful to 
consumers. After thirty years of debate, the ideology 
behind antitrust seems clear: most commentators agree 
on the fact that consumer protection should be the only 
goal of antitrust law. Although there have been calls to 
expand the role of antitrust to include income inequality 
and anti-globalisation concerns, some panellists noted 
that antitrust enforcers and courts may not be effective 
at assessing those concerns and balancing them against 
consumer welfare.
However, as argued by Herbert Hovenkamp ('The 
Antitrust Enterprise', 2008), the focus of the problem has 
shifted towards the implementation dimension: antitrust 
rules remain highly unfocused and excessively complex. 
In order to solve the problem, as well as to manage the 
disarray that is typically associated with the antitrust rule 
of reason, Hovenkamp offered a good set of tools and a 
comprehensive policy approach, with the objective of 
making rules more manageable by the federal courts. In 
his view, antitrust appears to be a defensible enterprise 
only if it helps the microeconomics work well after 
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accounting for the considerable costs of operating the 
system.
Finally, panellists debated about the effectiveness of 
US antitrust policy during the past decades: some 
panellists argued that the scope of US antitrust policy 
has been progressively narrowed down due to its focus 
on consumer welfare, while other participants disagreed 
on this point. The Chicago School succeeded against the 
backdrop of the deep economic recession in the 1970s, 
and this led to a ground-breaking change in the general 
economic thinking and encouraged the rise of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. However, more recently 
the faith in market forces has been put under attack, this 
is one of the consequences of the financial crisis in the 
USA and at the global level, the final effect on antitrust 
policy remain to be seen. 
V. Anti-globalisation and the Future of 
Antitrust Enforcement across the World 
Antitrust can be used in several different ways to achieve 
protectionist results. This is the case in China, where 
statutory objectives have been broadly defined so as to 
justify such policies. In this respect, participants pointed 
out that although the competition legal landscape is 
gradually evolving in Asia, through the enactment of 
modern competition laws, substantial concerns persist 
as to their application. First, it was observed that in 
certain countries, such as Vietnam, antitrust agencies 
lack effective independence and their own resources, 
with the main result being that they are subject to some 
influence by the Government. Furthermore, antitrust 
regulations have been criticised for not being sufficiently 
clear. Finally, it was remarked that exemptions protecting 
certain sectors from antitrust scrutiny have had the effect 
of excluding important activities that are held by the 
Government from the scope of the application of the law. 
Generally speaking, the State’s intervention in the 
national economy may take several different forms, 
including regulation, loans at preferential interest rate, 
state subsidies, industrial policy, and direct ownership 
participation. Although the concept of protectionism is 
ever evolving, when the promotion of a level global playing 
field is at stake, close supervision over the role played by 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and equivalent publicly-
controlled entities, without doubt, becomes crucial. 
Participants highlighted the fact that the importance 
of SOEs in the modern economy is certainly growing. 
SOEs account for 2% in a typical OECD jurisdiction, 
and around 10% in those developing countries where 
the role of the State in the market is particularly strong. 
The main concern is represented by the fact that SOEs 
are now acting at the global level and competing with 
private firms. Governments may be induced to grant 
SOEs or national champions certain advantages, ranging 
from fiscal advantages to preferential treatment in 
terms of bankruptcy, in return for possible public policy 
obligations, and this may have harmful spill over effects 
at the international level. As a matter of fact, 22% of the 
world’s largest 100 firms are State controlled companies, 
and this is the highest percentage ever recorded for 
decades. Furthermore, SOEs operate in sectors that 
are important to international supply chains, such as 
public utilities, manufacturing, metals and mining, and 
petroleum. Notably, it was observed that these trends are 
likely to continue to increase in the near future. 
Finally, the debate focused on the identification of 
the best policy instruments with which to address the 
challenges that are posed by the internationalisation of 
SOEs and the use of competition enforcement to promote 
national champions or foster protectionist policies. This 
was a growing threat, given the exponential growth in 
competition jurisdictions and globalisation, and one 
that needed to be addressed if the integrity of the global 
competition system was to be maintained. Participants 
agreed that promoting transparency; of authorities’ 
decision-making, due process rules and imposing high 
standards of governance could help to reduce the ability 
to use competition enforcement inappropriately. In 
this respect, it was suggested that proper adjustments 
in investment policy frameworks, in the light of the 
maintenance of a level playing field, would be key to 
reduce the incentives to apply protectionist measures. 
Finally, yet importantly, the adoption of competition-
related remedies with which to address market distortions 
arising from the State’s intervention at the domestic level 
would make a significant contribution to the matter, as 
would identify potential solutions affecting multilateral 
rules on trade.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
The second FCP Annual Conference debated the future 
developments of competition law enforcement around 
the globe. Besides the traditional issues posed by the 
globalisation of the economy, which has increased the 
number of cross-border competition law investigations, 
populist political movements also pose new challenges 
to competition law enforcement. To this regard, the 
consequences of Brexit, Trump administration and SOEs 
on competition law enforcement were debated during the 
conference in Florence.
The final part of the debate focused on the ambitious 
hypothesis of devising some sort of enhanced transatlantic 
cooperation on antitrust matters that may eventually lead 
to the adoption of a Treaty in a future that it is difficult to 
conceive now. First, it was pointed out that globalisation 
is not necessarily a constraint for the development of 
antitrust enforcement and may rather represent an 
opportunity. Thus, it was explained that although the 
opportunity of adopting a comprehensive approach does 
not sound realistic at present, it may appear logical from 
an efficiency point of view as since there is no apparent 
way back to globalisation. Participants agreed on the fact 
that the search for a compromise would be particularly 
challenging due to the numerous discrepancies in terms 
of cultural values as well as legal and economic traditions. 
These more complex and ambitious topics regarding 
the transnational governance of competition themes 
and conflicts could constitute the subject for a future 
Conference.  
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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies 
and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major 
research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda 
is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the 
expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
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The Florence Competition Programme (FCP) in Law & Economics is a project of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies at the European University Institute, which focuses on competition law and economics. FCP acts as a hub where 
European and international competition enforcers and other stakeholders can exchange ideas, share best-practices, debate 
emerging policy issues and enhance their networks. In addition, since 2011, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
organises a training for national judges in competition law and economics co-financed by DG Competition of the European 
Commission - ENTraNCE for Judges. 
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